Two Notes on Indeterminacy Problems by Robert P. Flood et al.





Working Paper No. 841




The research reported here is part of the NBER'S research program
in International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the
authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NEER WorkingPaper #84lA
January 1982
Two Notes on Indeterminacy Problems:
A. Collapsing Exchange—Rate Regimes
and the Indeterminacy Problem
ABS TRACT
Inthis paper we show, in an example, that the arbitrary behavior
which results in an indeterminacy in the time path of a flexibleexchange
rateand is associated with "badly behaved" speculation has a manifestation
under a regime of fixed rates in an indeterminacy in the time path of
governmentholding of international reserves. Thus, to the extent that
arbitrariness is characteristic of agents' behavior it is not resolved hut
only masked by the fixing of exchange rates.
Robert P. Flood
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This research was supported, in part, by NSFgrant SES—7926807.Dynamic models of exchange rate determination employing the rational
expectations assumption produce multiple solutions for the exchangerate.
Of these solutions only one is stable and dependentonly on market fundamentals.-'
Other solutions exhibit a degree of arbitrariness and often allowexplosive
Instability of theexchange rate, with the explosion driven only by agents'
arbitrary (but rational) beliefs.
The assumption of rational expectations hasprovided discipline
tothe discussion of arbitrary speculative behavior in foreignexchange
markets. In the past, the possibility of arbitrary.or "badly behaved"
speculation has been martialed as an argument against flexible rates and
thus in favor of fixed rates.-' However, to the extent thatarbitrariness
is a characteristic of agents' behavior it is notresolved but only masked
by the fixing of exchange rates. The objective of thepresent paper is to
demonstrate that the possibility of multiple solutions alsoappears under
a regime of fixed rates, manifesting itself
in a multiplicity of pathsof
government international reserve holding.
For the case of fixed rates, the indeterminacy ofreserve paths
arises because of the possibility of arbitrary (butrational) speculative
attacks on the currency whose price is being fixed. Itis in the timing
and magnitude of such an attack that the identicalarbitrary behavior which
might cause a solution multiplicity under flexible rates manifestsitself
under fixed rates.
In studying a price fixing scheme for gold, Salant andHenderson (1978)
first proposed a model for the timing ofa rational speculative attack on
government stocks. The attack causes the ollapse of the fixed—priceregime—2—
and a shift to a f1oating—pice regime. Krugman (1979) applied a similar
idea to the collapse of a fixed exchange rate. However, in bothcases, the
fixed—price system is bound to collapse due to market fundamentals. In
Salant and Hendersonts paper private consumption of gold ultimately forces
a speculative attack while in Krugman's paper the regime collapse
is forced by a steady expansion of domestic credit.
As an example to demonstrate our claim that a fixed exchange—rate
regime contains the same arbitrary element as a flexib1e--rate regime, we
construct a simplified version of Krugman's model. The model is suitable
for solving explicitly for the time of a collapse in the case either that
government policy alone forces the collapse or that an arbitrary speculative
attack causes the collapse.
I) A Model of the Collapse of a Fixed- Exchange—Rate Regime
For our example we will employ a model of a small country in a world
of purchasing power parity. We will assume that agents have perfect foresight
and that the assets available for domestic residents are domesticmoney,
foreign money, and foreign bonds. The government holds a stock of foreign
currency for use in fixing the exchange rate. Foreign currency, which yields
no monetary services to domestic agents, will be dominated by domestic money
and by foreign bonds; therefore, private domestic agents will hold no
foreign currency.
The model is built around a demand function for domestic money:1
Md(t)
_____= a0—
a1r(t) a0 >0,a1 >0 (1)
P (t)—3—
where Md(t) is the nominal'quantity of domestic money demanded, P(t) the
domestic price level and r(t) the level of the domestic interest rate. We
assume both purchasing power parity and uncovered interest parity,
which respectively are stated as
P(t) =S(t).P* (la)
r(t) =r*+ ((t)/S(t)) (ib)
where *isthe foreign price level, S(t) is the level of the exchange rate,
r* is the level of the foreign interest rate, and ((t)/S(t)) is the actual
and expected percentage rate of change of S(t). The last of these definitions
reflects our assumption of perfect foresight. The above may be manipulated
to yield
Md(t) 3 S(t) -c(t),3>0, >0 (2)
where 3(aP* —a1P*r*),which we assume to be postive, and ca1P*. We
assume r* and P* to be constant.
The supply of money, M(t), is the sum of domestic credit, D(t), and
the book value of international reserves, R(t),
M(t) =D(t)+ R(t). (3)
We also assume that D(t) grows at the constant rate p,
D(t)=p. (4)
When the exchange rate is fixed, at some levelS, reserves adlust to
keep the money market in equilibrium. With S(t) fixed at S the quantity of
reserves at any time t is
R(t) =3—D(t), (5)—4—
and the rate of change of reserves (the balance of payments) is obtained as
the time derivative of (5), which is
R(t) =—f(t) —.i. (6)
With a finite level of reserves and >0,the fixed—rate regime
cannot last forever. The plan of our exposition is first to describe our
model after the collapse of the fixed—rate regime and then to investigate
the transition from fixed rates to the post—collapse flexible—rate system.
After studying such a collapse due to market fundamentals (.i> 0)we will
describe an arbitrary collapse.
If a collapse of the fixed—rate regime takes place at some time Z
then the government will have exhausted its reserve stock at time Z. In
general the reserve stock is exhausted in a final speculative attack yielding
a discrete downward jump in domestic money. Thus, following the attack,
money market equilibrium is
M(Z) =S(Z)
-c(Z), (7)
where Z is notation for the instant after the attack at Z, and
M(Z+) =D(Z)as R(Z+) =O.i'Under this flexible rate regime, with
M(t) =(t)=i, wehypothesize the solution S(t)A0 + A1M(t) and substitute
this solution into the equation M(t) 3 S(t) —S(t)finding Ao =ap/32
and =1/3.Thus,
cqi M(t)









where Z is notation for the moment before the collapse at Z. The collapse
in question is one that is forseen by agents so the exchange ratemay not
jump at the instant of collapse. If it were to jump capital gains
at an infinite rate would also be forseen. The absence of such profits
implies S =S(Z+).Further, since D is continuous, when equation (9) is
subtracted from (8a) and the result rearranged we obtain
R(Z) = . (10)
To find time Z we first use (6) to obtain
R(t) =R(0)—pt ,t<Z (11)
or
R(Z) =R(0)—pZ. (ha)




Equation (12) makes intuitive sense; an increase in reserves (R(0)) delays
the collapse and an increase in iihastensthe collapse; as i-- 0the
collapse is delayed indefinitely.-!—6—
The Indeterminacy Problem
The resu1t of the previous section were predicated on the exchange
rate's following market fundamentals after the collapse. In general,
however, following the collapse the exchange rate obeys-p'
3 a.iM(t)
S(t)A(Z)expC_—(t--Z) } —+ (13)
32 3
where A(Z) is an arbitrary constant determined at time Z, which previously we
have set at zero. Allowing an arbitrary value of A(Z) we have
w M(Z+)
s(z÷) =A(Z)+ —+ . (14)
32
Br using our previous argument about capital gains (S =S(Z+))and the
continuity of D, (14) may be combined with (9) to yield
ct
R(Z_) =3A(Z) + —. (15)
(ila) is then used to obtain
R(O). a 3
z =( ——)—-—A(Z). (16)
3 p
Equation (16) reveals that the timing of the collapse depends not only on
market fundamentals (R(O)/p —a/3)but also on the constant A(Z). A(Z)
captures the behavior possibly causing an indeterminacy in the path of the—7--
post—collapse floating rat.-' An increase in A(Z) will hasten the
collapse, causing it to take place at a higher value of R(Z_), and thus
magnify the amplitude of the attack on the currency.
A special case of interest involves ji= 0,which is a situation
where the fixed—rate regime need never collapse in theabsence of arbitrary
behavior. For this case, equation (15) becomes R(Z 3 A(Z). If i= 0
then R(t) is some constant R(O). Thus, the collapse would take placeat
any arbitrary date Z when agents choose to make A(Z) =R(O)/3./
Conclusion
The analysis in this paper has shown that the behavioral indeterminacy
which arises for exchange—rate paths under flexible exchange rates manifests
itself in an indeterminacy in the timing of a speculative attack in a fixed—
rate regime. Such a behavioral indeterminacy, if present, is an economic
force which is masked, not purged, by the fixing of exchange rates.Foo tno tes
1/ In particular, we have i'ti mind the models of Dornbusch (1976), Frenkel (1976)
and Mussa (1976).
2/ Perhaps the best known discussion of "badly behaved" speculation is in
Friedman (1953). More recently such problems have been studied by Britton
(1970) and Driskill and McCafferty (1980).
3/ We view equation (1) as being the linear terms of a Taylor Series expansion
of some non—linear function Md(t)/P(t) 2(r). Our linearization is
appropriate for values of a0, a1, and r(t) such that a0—a1r(t) >0.We
have adopted the present linearization rather than the more standard semi—log
linearization to exploit the inherent linearity of our money supply definition,
presented below.
4/ D(t) is a continuous variable so D(Z+) =D(Z)=D(Z_).
5/ A transition from fixed rates to flexible rates due to a collapse of the
fixed—rate regime implies that the process governing reserves is not stationary.
Such nonstationarity, if present in a transition, would make inappropriate
a technique like that of Girton and Roper (1977), which was used to wed data
from a fixed—rate regime with data from a flexible—rate regime.
6/ Our general solution is specific to the process D(t) =.. Foran
arbitrary path of D(t) and thus M(t) we would have,
3 N(r)
S(t) =A(Z)exp{—(t-z)+ exp{_t I exp{L_r}dT.
a a t a
7/ Notice that if a collapse takes place due to the arbitrary element
A(Z) then the post—collapse exchange rate' ust be expected to follow what
Flood and Garber (1980) have called a bubble. Such a bubble could be
distinguished in the data using tests like those in Flood and Garber (1980).
8/ In Flood and Carber (1981) we refer to such a collapse as being generated
entirely by mass hysteria.References
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Two Notes on Indeterminacy Problems:
B.'urther Evidence on Price Level Bubbles
ABSTRACT
In this note we study means of testing for price—level bubbles in
inflationary situations. Our results contradict the outcomes of some
tests reported in Flood and Garber's (1980) paper on bubbles in that the
hypothesis of price—level bubbles cannot be rejected using likelihood
ratio tests.
Robert P. Flood














This research was supported by NSF grant SES—7926RO7.Price solutions in dynamic models which assume rational expectations
always contain an arbitrary, time-dependent element in additon to the ex-
ogenous forcing variables of the model. The arbitrary element, which enters
the solution through self-generating expectations, is often explosive; and
the number of such possible arbitrary elements in a solution is infinite.
Many attempts have been made to preclude the market selection of such solu-
tions through a priori reasoning.1 However, Flood and Garber (1980), here-
after F÷G, showed that the question of the existence of these Ttbubb1et
solutions is an empirical problem, subject to the usual methods of hypothesis
testing. Using data from the German hyperinflation, they accepted the hypo-
thesis that bubbles of the type generated in a particular rational expectations
model were not a factor in the determination of the German price level.
However, the German episode is only one example; to establish confidence
that bubbles are merely technical artifacts of rational expectations models,
it is necessary to test for their existence in other cases. In this note,
we extend in a number of ways the methods used by Fi-G to test for bubbles.2
First, we examine data from a number of other hyperinflationary experiences
in the same manner as F+G. Second, we use likelihood ratio tests in addi-
tion to the t—tests originally employed. Finally, we test for whether a
bubble simultaneously existed across the countries which experienced hyper-
inflation in the early 1920's; this test is a means of implementing the con-
ceptual experiment proposed by F-t-G in deriving asymptotic distributions for
their test statistics. The results which we report are mixed: the t—tests
lead to the acceptance of the hypothesis that bubbles did not exist while in
most cases the likelihood ratio tests lead to the rejection of the hypothesis.In section I we report our results from tests for individual countries. In
section II we describe our test for the simultaneousexistence of a bubble
across countries.
I) Individual Country Tests
The model used here to test for the presence of a bubble is identical
to that used by F+G. A Cagan—type money demand function is combined with an
exogenous process determining money growth rates to produce a solution for
the inflation rate. The parameters of this solution and of the money demand
function are then estimated simultaneously with non-linear, cross-equation
restrictions. Explicitly, the system of equations to be estimated is
(1) m —Pt
=+O-t+ + [1oney Demand]
c&<O
(2) + it-i + + kt-k ÷At.:+ V
[Inflation Solution]
where m is the logarithm of the money stock, Pt is the logarithm of the price
level, -isthe actual inflation rate between time t and time
t÷1, and -m1is the percentage growth in the money stock between time
t-1 and t. is the expected inflation rate between t and t+1 based on time
t information. All variables realized at or before time t are included in
the time t information set. Equation (1) contains a time trend term, Ot.
Equation (2) is a rational expectations solution for the inflation rate if it
is assumed that the growth rate of money is a kth order autoregressive pro-
cess. The random disturbances are c, assumed to be a random walk, and Vt,
a white noise disturbance. Finally, for (2) to be a rational expectations
solution it is necessary that the constant root 'V 1. The term A0Yt
in equation (2) is the arbitrary term associated with rational expectationssolutions; if A 0 then there is no bubble in the solution. Since e =
÷it-i+ 2ut2 + kUtk +At, we have a system of two equations
with non-linear cross-equation restrictions. If we assume thatv and the
random disturbance of the first-differenced version of equation 1 are normally
distributed, we can estimate the model's parameters with maximum likelihood
methods.
The episodes which we examined were the Hungarian, Polish and German
cases.3 The sample periodswere July, 1921-February, 1924 for Hungary, July,
1921-November, 1923 for Poland, and July, 1920-June, 1923 for Germany.4 For
each country, the parameters of money demand and of the inflation solution
were estimated first with A restricted to equal zero and then with A0. 0 0
Four lags on the growth rate of money were used in equation (2). The results
for these two types of estimates are reported in Tables I and II, respectively.5
From Table II, the t-statistics constructed from ratios::of the estimates of
A to their standard errors indicate that the null hypothesis that A00
would be accepted for each country at standard significance levels. However,
if likelihood ratio tests are used this result is reversed. The values of
-2logA, where A is -the ratio of the maximized restricted likelihood function
to the maximized unrestricted likelihood function, are 7.59, 1.37, and 3.87
for the German, Polish and Hungarian cases, respectively. For the German and
Hungarian cases, this leads to the rejection of the hypothesis that A0 =0
at the 95% significance level.6 In the Polish case, the hypothesis can still
be accepted for standard significance levels.
3Table I
















































































































































Standard errors in parentheses.II) A Test for a Simultaneous Bubble
In this section we describe a tes: for whether a bubble existed simul-
taneously in Germany, Poland, and Hungary.7 We perform such a test in order
to implement the conceptual experiment of observing parallel bubbles suggested
by F+G in their footnote 18. A large sample of such parallel bubbles is
sufficient to produce well—behaved asymDtotic distributions for our test
statistics, whereas the usual conceptual experiment of letting time go to
infinity produces degenerate asymptotic distributions due to the explosive
term in (2).
Associated with each country in our sample is a first differenced version
of equation (1) and an inflation equation (2). The parameters of these equa-
tions are allowed to differ across countries. The hypothesis is that at the
same time (tO) a bubble of the same magnitude arose in the inflation solu-
tions of each country. Since the a parameter is not restricted to be equal
across countries, the exploding term, may be different across countries
for t0.Hence, the magnitude of the "mass hysteria" which produced these
explosive terms is assumed to be the same across countries only at one moment
of time. Since the earliest observations are from the German case, we set
t0 on July, 1920. Thus, the hypothesis is that on July, 1920 an arbitrary
element of ecual magnitude, A, entered the inflation rate solutions for Ger-
many, Poland and Hungary and continued to explode throughout the remainder
of the data set.
We estimate six equations simultaneously with maximum likelihood methods.
We assume for purposes of this estimation that the random disturbances in
equations (1) and (2) have a non-zero contemporaneous covariance for a given
country but have zero covariances across countries and across time. Then the
only gain in efficiency to the simultaneous estimation method arises through
4the restrictions which make the parameter A common to each country.
We report our results in Table III. Again, using a t-statistic we accept
the hypothesis that there was no bubble common to the three countries. Based
on our assumptions on the disturbances' covariances, the logarithm of the max-
imized likelihood function estimated withA0 restricted to zero is the sum
of the logarithms of the restricted likelihood functions for the individual
countries reported in Table I. The logarithm of the restricted likelihood
function is 327.OL.5 while that for the unrestricted likelihood is 332.687.
Since in this case -2.logX =11.28,we reject at standard significance levels
the hypothesis that there was no bubble common to these episodes.
5Table III
Joint Parameter Estimates: A Restricted to be Equal Across Countries
0
Parameter Germany Poland Hungary
0 —.0360 —.0104 —.039
(.0312) (.0334) (.0217)
a. —.7351 —1.071 —1.251
(.1814) (.2663) (.303)














loglikelihood 332.6869 - —
DW 1.723 1.976 2.097
Eq. 1 R2 .1916 .1286 .3047
.0322 .0288 .0137
DW 1.392 1.605 1.448
Eq. 2 R2
.4991 .4287 .106
{a2 .0524 .0544 .0263
Standard errors in parentheses.III) Concluding Remarks
Although our results are mixed, we interpret them more as a con-
tradiction than as a confirmation of the results in F ÷ G (1980).
Thus, the technical issue of indeterminacy in rational expectations
models remains in an unresolved state. Many theoretical maximizing
models of money demand, particularly those of the overlapping genera-
tions variety, are fully consistent with price-level bubbles. Empir-
ical work designed to evaluate the hypothesis of no bubbles is incon-
clusive. Yet, virtually all current research involving macroeconomic
rational expectations models invokes the attractive assumption of the
absence of speculative bubbles. We conclude that the empirical foun-
dation for this assumption is not yet firmly laid.8
6Notes
1
See for instance Brock (1973), Brock and Scheinkman (1980), Lucas (1980),
or Starr (1980).
2
Burrneister and Wall (1980) have extended the F ÷ G exercise for Germany
to the case of a stochastic bubble.
Attempts to estimate the model for Russia and Austria were unsuccessful.
When the value of A0 is restricted to equal zero, the estimate of ct for Rus-
sia is a positive value between zero and one and the estimate for Austria is
a large negative number that is not statistically significant. For Austria,
the likelihood function is relatively flat with respect to ct, as observed
previously by Salemi and Sargent (1978). For these reasons the results are
not reported.
The sources for German money and price data are the same as those listed
in F +G(1980). For the Hungarian data, we used Young (Vol. II,
p. 322 and p. 321) for money and prices. Polish data are also taken from
Young (Vol. II, p. 349 and p. 353). For Russia, we employed data reported
in Katzenellenbaum (1925, pp. 57-8). Finally, we used Waires de Bordes (1924,
pp. 48-50 and p.88) for Austrian data.
The maximum likelihood estimates were computed by minimizing the negative
of the concentrated likelihood function, using the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell
method. For a discussion of methods of non-linear optimization, see Judge,
Griffiths, Hill, and Lee (1980, pp. 727-45).. The Davidon-Fletcher-Powell
method uses analytical first partial derivatives and computes an approxima-
tion to the inverse of the Hessian matrix in order to locate the minimum of
a function. The non-linear optimization routine in TSP uses numerical approx-
imations for first partial derivatives. Optimization methods that use analyti-
cal first partial derivatives generally outperform methods that do not. The
variances of the parameter estimates were computed by inverting the information
matrix evaluated at the parameter estimates. The ct—estimate for Germany in
Table II differs from the corresponding ct—estimate of -1.615 in F +G(1980).
This difference is the result of different optimization techniques and dif-
ferent convergence criteria. To compute the maximum likelihood estimates,
weexperimented with different starting values and different convergence
criteria, ndwefound that the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell routine converged
prematurelyinsome cases.
6
Maddala(1977, pp. 179-81) discusses hypothesis testing with maximum
likelihood estimation and notes that the different test statistics can pro-
duce contradictory results in actual practice. For an example, see Berndt
and Savin (1977).
7
We excluded Russia and Austria for the same reasons cited in footnote
2. We added Russia and Austria separately to the simultaneous bubble model
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